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BOOK REVIEWS
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS.

By William L. Prosser. St. Paul: West

Publishing Co., 1941, pp. 1309.
This is an up-to-date treatise on the law of torts. The author has
expressed, and very lucidly, the modern thought on the subject of tort liability.
He uses present-day terminology. For these and other reasons the book is
easily readable as well as instructive and interesting. Although a lawyer's
book, it may be used with profit by the student in the law school because it
avoids ponderosity and abstractions, and is written in a succinct style.
Those of us who have devoted years to the study of Torts heartily agree
with the statement of Professor Prosser which he makes in his Preface: "It
may safely be said that since that date [18531 no other branch of the law has
undergone such rapid and extensive change, expansion and development as the
law of Torts. There has been a marked acceleration of this development during
the last three decades. The volume of case law dealing with Torts has
increased enormously, and there has been a vast outpouring of comment and
discussion in legal periodicals, some of which is of much more value than
anything yet included within the pages of any Text." On page 5 of his text
the author says: "New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and
the progress of the law is marked by many cases of first impression, in which
the court has struck out boldly to create a new cause of action, where none
had been recognized before. The law of Torts is anything but static, and the
limits of its development are never set * * *." It is not a cause for wonder-

ment, therefore, that the courts have refused to define a tort with judiclal or
exclusive certainty.
Not only should the content of the various legal subjects be taught to the
student in the law school, but the relationship of these subjects to each other
should be pointed out to him, so that he may understand that law or jurisprudence, including equity, is an entity and not merely a group of unrelated rules
or principles. The author makes mention of this when he states in his Preface
that the law of Torts "interlocks at every step with Property, Contracts,
Agency, Statutes, Equity, Criminal Law, and many other branches which usually
are regarded as more or less separate and distinct. It is trite to say that the
whole is a seamless web, and that to touch it anywhere is to take hold of it all."
"In recent years," says the author on page 11 of his text, "there has been
a growing appreciation of the fact that the law of Torts is concerned chiefly
with the distribution of the losses inevitable in a civilized community, in accordance with the court's conception of social justice." The principles underlying
such distribution of losses, i.e., the grounds of tort liability, are quite fully
discussed by the writer of this treatise, who says in this connection on page 15:
"The law of Torts is concerned primarily with the adjustment of the conflicting
interests of individuals to achieve a desirable social result. Perhaps more than
any other branch of the law, the law of Torts is a battleground of social
theory," and on page 33: "the law of Torts is a battlefield of the conflict
between capital and labor, between business competitors and others who have
conflicting claims in the economic struggle."
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The author pays his respects to some of the more prominent writers of
torts text books (naming them), among whom he mentions Professors Burdick
and Harper, and proceeds to say on page 24: "The influence of these text writers
upon the courts has been very great; and perhaps even more influential has
been the constant discussion of tort problems in the law reviews." On page 24
the author continues: "Within the past seventeen years there has been a very
significant attempt at a searching and exhaustive analysis of the entire field in
the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Torts * * *. The
form of the Restatement is perhaps unfortunate, in that it seeks to reduce the
law to a definite set of black-letter rules or principles, ignoring all contrary
authority, and the law of Torts in its present stage of development does not
lend itself readily to such treatment; and there are those who have disagreed
with many of its conclusions." Perhaps this objection of Professor Prosser
would be substantially lessened if the country were covered by state annotations
of the Restatement.
"There are many possible approaches to the law of Torts," says the author
on page 34, "and many different arrangements of the material to be considered
have been attempted. Other than mere convenience in discussion, there is of
course no inherent merit in any of them." Your reviewer agrees. The same
result is accomplished, whatever the arrangement of the material may be, so
long as the arrangement is sufficiently comprehensive to cover the whole field.
The author's arrangement of his material in this book conforms to the later
convention. On page 34 the author states the "General Plan" of his treatment
as follows: "Tort liability always rests upon one of three fundamental grounds.
These are:
a. Intent of the defendant to interfere with the plaintiff's interests.
b. Negligence.
c. Strict liability, without intent or negligence, imposed for reasons of
policy."
This plan or method of treatment is the same as that adopted by the Restatement of Torts. The author then proceeds to consider these grounds of tort
liability and in the order named, and in connection with each discusses those
torts or invasions of the plaintiff's interests, which have been more or less
exclusively identified with each, together with the defenses available against
them, and in doing so he has endeavored to adhere to the terminology and the
concepts which are in use in the courts, and which, therefore, are familiar to
the bar.
After discussing the history of "Trespass and Case", and the meaning of
"Intent", the author deals with Battery, Assault, Mental Disturbance, False
Imprisonment, Trespass (to land and chattels) and Conversion, all of which
are "intentional" torts. Then follows a discussion of the defenses to these
torts, among which defenses are Privilege, Mistake, Consent, Self-Defense,
Defense of Property, Necessity (the privilege of acting under necessity,
including Forcible Entry on Land), Recapture of Chattels, Legal Authority
(privilege of public officers, including legislators and judges, and arrest without a warrant, etc.). Then follows a lengthy discussion of the tort of
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Negligence, including the principles of foreseeability, res ipsa loquitur and
"proximate cause", and which also includes the defenses to the last-named tort,
such as assumption of risk, cofitributory negligence, last clear chance and
imputed negligence. "Strict Liability" is then treated, the author saying, on
page 426: "Until about the close of the nineteenth century, the progress of the
law was in the direction of limiting liability in tort to 'fault', in the sense of a
wrongful intent or a departure from the community standard of conduct" (lack
of reasonable care). "Modern law is developing a policy of imposing liability
without 'fault', in cases where the defendant's activity is one involving a high
degree of danger to others, even though it is carried on with all possible precautions. The basis of this policy is a social philosophy which places the burden
of the more or less inevitable losses due to socially desirable conduct upon
those best able to bear them, or to shift them to society at large." On page 466
the author says that this principle "is being extended, both by statute and by
the common law, into other fields."
It is submitted that "strict liability" in the sense of "liability without fault"
is neither strict nor without fault. Surely it is not less anti-social to subject a
man to unreasonable risk by a highly dangerous though careful act, than it is
to subject him to a risk, no more unreasonable, by the doing of a permitted act
in a careless way.
The author's three bases of liability might be increased to include a fourth
founded on restitutional necessities, and exemplified by liability for such things
as unintentional, non-negligent and non-hazardous encroachments, -and the
"trespasses" of pasture-consuming animals.
A discussion of Vicarious Liability and of Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation follows. The tort of Nuisance is treated together with
Remedies for and Defenses to that tort. Attention is given to Trespassers,
Licensees and Invitees, Vendor and Vendee, and Lessor and Lessee, under the
caption "Owners and Occupiers of Land." There is a chapter on the liability
of Suppliers of Chattels and Contractors, following which is a chapter on
Misrepresentation including Deceit. The author devotes a chapter each to
Defamation, Misuse of Legal Procedure including Malicious Prosecution and
Abuse of Process. Torts to Family Relations has a chapter, in which the
author also treats of survival of actions and actions for wrongful death. A
chapter is devoted to Economic Relations including Interference with Contractual Relations and Injurious Falsehood (Slander of Title). There is also a
chapter on the Right of Privacy, followed by a treatment of harms by the
sovereignty, municipal and charitable corporations, infants and insane persons
under the caption "Immunities". There is also a discussion of Joint Torts,
and Election to Sue for Restitution in which the tort of Conversion is
considered.
There is an unusual number of valuable footnotes. A Table of Contents, a
Table of Cases, and an Index add to the value of the book, and make for a
readier reference to its textual contents. About 1500 cases are cited, most of
which have been decided since 1910. Upwards of 2000 articles, notes and
comments in legal periodicals are also referred to. The author has certainly
done a prodigious amount of research.
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The essential elements of the particular torts might have been treated more
specifically so that they would stand out with greater prominence.
DAVID STXWART EDGAR.*

AamDINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT-REPORT OF THE ATORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITtE ON BANKRUPTCY 1940. U. S. Government Printing

Office, 1941, pp. 330.
As an appropriate means of celebrating the ushering in of the four hundredth birthday of the English Bankruptcy Law which first saw the light of
day in 1542 in the reign of King Henry VIII, and the 142nd anniversary of the
first American Bankruptcy Act of 1800, the Bench and Bar are taking deep
draughts of the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Bankruptcy.
It may be assumed that the "festivities" will be concluded with the passage of
a Congressional Act embracing substantially the recommendations of the
Committee.
When earlier bankruptcy laws were the subject of criticism, Congress,
instead of correcting the evil conditions by amendatory legislation, yielded to
this criticism by repealing the then existing law. (Act of 1800 repealed 1803;
Act of 1841 repealed 1843; Act of 1876 repealed 1878.) However, since the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 Congress has endeavored to correct the evils which
crept into the Bankruptcy Law and administration by enactment of constructive
amendments, thereby avoiding a hiatus in giving relief to the debtor and the
creditor-and society at large.
On April 15, 1939, Frank Murphy, then Attorney General, now an Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, appointed a Committee on Bankruptcy composed of the following:
Robert H. Jackson, then Solicitor General, later Attorney General (now
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court); Francis M. Shea,
Dean of the University of Buffalo Law School; Robert P. Patterson, then
United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judge (now Under Secretary of
War); Jesse H. Jones, Secretary of Commerce; Edward H. Foley, Counsel to
Treasury Department; Jerome N. Frank, then Chairman of Securities &
Exchange Commission (now United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judge) ;
Thomas McAllister, Justice of Supreme Court of Michigan; William J. Campbell, then United States Attorney (now United States District Judge, Northern
District of Illinois) ; and Lloyd K. Garrison, Dean of University of Wisconsin
Law School.
In appointing the Committee the then Attorney General, Frank Murphy,
stated :
In seeking to improve the administration of justice in the Federal courts,
one of the most important subjects that requires attention, is the manner in
which estates of bankrupt and insolvent estates are liquidated and administered.
* Professor of Law, St John's University School of Law.

